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ABS TRACT
This paper illustrates the role for macroeconomic
policy coordination when interdependent economies are pur-
suing disinflationary policies. Under flexible exchange
rates, policy makers have an incentive to reduce inflation
by pursuing contractionary policies that yield a currency
appreciation. In a Nash, perfect foresight equilibrium,
policy authorities in the model pursue contractionary poli-
cies to achieve currency appreciation, but these attempts
cancel out, with the result that all countries end up pur-
suing excessively contractionary policies (relative to a
symmetric Pareto optimum). The paper presents these results







One of the major considerations in the original design of the
Bretton Woods system was the control of "beggarthyneIghbor" exchange rate
policies. As the post World War I gold—exchange standard disintegrated In
the 1930s under the weight of world deflation, several countries pursued
exchange rate devaluations in the hope of gaining competitive advantages
vIs——vis their trading partners. In the eyes of the Bretton Woods archi-
tects, these "competitive devaluations" contributed to the financial turbu-
lence of the 1930s and the breakdown of the world trading system. Henceforth,
countries' exchange rate policies were to be subject to international sur-
veillance, in part to prevent countries from gaining undue economic benefits
at the expence of others. This international control was enshrined In
Article IV of the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement.
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods par—value system in the
early 1970s, the problem of "beggar—thy—neighbor" exchange rate policies
have again come to the fore. But now there is a new twist. As concern
shifted from fighting unemployment to fighting Inflation, countries have
often pursued a policy of exchange rate appreciation as an anti—inflation
weapon. A rising exchange rate reduces import prices and hence domestic
inflation, with particularly large effects if domestic wages and prices
slow down in response to reduced import prices. Just as a competitive de-
preciation may work in part by exporting unemployment, a "competitive appre-
ciation" may work in part by exporting inflation, thus hindering inflation
control in other countries.
—1——2—
The possibility of beggar—thy—neighbor exchange rate policy is not,
in itself, evidence of a structural problem in the world monetary system.It
may be true for example that when one country'sbeggar—thy—neighbor policies
are counteracted by another's, both countries are left betterof f than they
1/ would be in the absence of the policy moves.— But as we know fromtariff
wars, it is possible that both countries areleft worse off, even when they
each react optimally to the other'spolicies.' A system of rules (or
"code of conduct") may well raise welfare in both countries above thelevels
reached when each country acts in its narrow self—interest, takingthe
others' policies as given. In technical terms, the cooperative outcome
may be Pareto superior to the Nash equilibriumin policies.
The basic result has been known since the important workof Johnson
(1953) on tariff wars and Hamada (1974, 1976, and 1979) on monetarypolicy
under fixed exchange rates.Johansen (1982) and Canzoneri and Gray (1982)
have applied the argument to the current policy environment,in which supply
shocks have worsened inflation and current account balancessimultaneously
in many economies, causing many countries to pursue beggar_thy_neighbor
policies to reduce external deficits and Inflation.
This note seeks to add two aspects to the Johansenand Canzoneri—
Gray papers: (1) a particular channel throughwhich policy inefficiencies
mayarise;and (2) an intertemporal illustration of the coordination problem.
On the first point, I stress the aim of policy makersin seeking a strong
exchange rate as an anti—inflation device. Each country pursuescontrac—
tionary policies to strengthen the exchange rate.The policies counteract—3—
each other; both countries end up with a contraction, but neither succeeds
in currency appreciation. The argument is used to illustrate why the supply
shocks of 1973 and 1979 in the environment of flexible rates have led to
excessive world contraction.
On the second point, almost all illustrations of the problems of
exchange rate interaction and coordination have been static, or repeated one—
period games.(In a very useful recent paper, Miller and Salmon (1983)
provide the general solution of the N—player infinite—horizon linear—quadra-
tic differential game, but they must resort to numerical simulation to solve
their example. I offer an analytical solution in this paper.) I show here
that the arguments about "competitive appreciationt' readily extend to a dyna-
mic context. This is a little bit surprising since Buiter and Miller (1982)
have pointed out that the inflation gains achieved by a real appreciation must
be "given back" at a later date, when the real appreciation unwinds. How-
ever, with utility quadratic in inflation and output, policy makers will
still choose to take a real appreciation early on when they are trying to
reduce a high initial rate of inflation.
Section I presents a static model of competitive appreciation, and
Section II considers the dynamic extension. The models are highly stylized
to illustrate clearly the issues at hand; no attempt at generality is made.
Some extensions are suggested at the end of the paper.
I. A Static Model
Consider two completely symmetrical economics. Each produces a—4—
single final good that is an imperfect substitute for the otherin final de-
mand. Let Q and Q* be total output in the home and foreign economies (with
"*"signifyingforeign), and P and P* be output prices in national currencies.
E is the exchange rate, assumed to be floating, (and measured as thedomestic
currency price of a unit of foreign exchange). Forall variables, the lower-
case form will represent the logarithm of the upper—case counterpart(e.g.
q =lnQ ,p=inP); and ""willsignify change between periods (e.g.
= —
Thebasic assumption of the model is that domestic growth in ex-




Under this assumption, not only high levels of demand, butdemand expansion
relative to one's trading partner, will have inflationary consequencesin
the short run. Equation (1) may be justified in several ways, asthe basic
property is consistent with several models ofinternational macroeconomics.
Most simply, we might suppose that the proportion oftotal world, demand spent
on domestic goods is a negative function of therelative price p_e_p* ,so
that (q_q*) =D(*),where is an elasticity of demand. Taking
first differences, we arrive at (1).It is possible, however, that domestic
fiscal policy (f) can shift the distribution of world demand, saytowards
the home good, so that (1) would be modified to be
* D * *
(q—q ) —(p—e—p) + f—f ).—5—
Implicitly, (1) is more accurate for models in which variations in output
depend on monetary policy rather than fiscal policy.
We will assume that each country produces its final output with




We will further assume that is a fixed markup over the wage, so that
(3) =
Theprice of the intermediate input (e.g. oil) is assumed to be fixed in
termsofa basket of QandQ*,withweights 0.5 each and real price s:
=+0.5 + 0.5(+)
Also, since the intermediate input is a pure tradeable good, = —
Thewage is assumed to be fully indexed to consumer prices
though with a one—period lag, and to respond as well to the level of demand
(as measured by q):
=ci
+—6—
Finally, consumer prices are taken to be a weighted average ofhome and
foreign final good prices:
(6) = +(l—y) (* + a)t t
= + (_a)
When(2) through (6) are combined, we arrive at an "inertial" Phillips
curve equation for each country:
(7) = +iq-+[(l-a)/a] -[(l-y)+ 0.5(1-a) /a]i
= +iq + [(l-a)/a]a + [(1-1) + O.5(l_a)/a}lTt c c1
t t
— P
whereit =p—e—p.Wesee that a real appreciation at home (1T> 0) re-
duces inflation by reducing import prices of foreign final goodsand the
intermediate input. The real appreciation raises foreign inflation, however,
to the extent that it lowers domestic inflation.




= + + (—)q_1 — +[(l_a)/a]t
t t—l
where =a[(l—y) + O.5(l—a)/aI. We will see thatis a good measure of the
degree of interdependence in this model.When=0there are no problems
of policy coordination, and asincreases, coordination becomes moreand
more important.—7—
Consider, now, the one—period model in which home and foreign
policy makers react to a supply shock, >0.We will assume that the goal
of policy is to minimize quadratic loss functions 2 in and
(8) 2 =:+q
= +q2
In the symmetric cooperative outcome, q and q* are chosen to minimize the
simple average ofand 1*: 0.5(1 +1*).The solution to this problem will
be Pareto optimal. In the Nash, non—cooperative outcome q is chosen to
minimize Q, taking q* as given; and q* is chosen to minimize ,takingq
as given. In general, the Nash non—cooperative outcome will not be Pareto
optimal.
Assume that the shock occurs during a period of initial equili—
* briuin,with p =p = = _1 = 0.
Ct1 c1
In that case we see from (7) that
[(l_a)/a] —[(1—i)+ O.5(l_a)/a}Tr.
Domestic policy makers can reduce inflation in the period of the shock only
by inducing a real appreciation (7r >0).Similarly, foreign policy makers
can reduce only by inducing <0.Thus, a decrease in home inflation
comes at the expense of foreign inflation, and vice versa. By adding the
inflation equations we see clearly this negative tradeoff:
A A* A = — +2(1—a)/a s
Ct t—8—
Because the only anti—inflation policy available in this one—period
model is beggar—thy—neighbor, the optimal cooperative policy is obvious.
Both countries should accept =(l—a)/a,andfully accomodate the sup-
ply shock so that =q
=O.CtThewelfare loss in each country is then
held to= = fa/(l—a)
If the policy—makers follow Nash, non—cooperative strategies, how-
ever, both countries will end up with lower levelsof social welfare. They
will have the same inflation rate ex post, but accompanied by a loss in out-
put. The reason is clear. If the foreign country sets q=0,the home
country has an incentive to set <0,thereby Inducing a real appreciation
and exporting inflation.
To show this rigorously, we simply show that at the cooperative
equilibrium, dcI/dq >0(for q held fixed). In that case the home country
has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the cooperative solution.Note
that for a given q, domestic authorities know that a small reductionIn
output, <0,leads to a fall in domestic Inflation given by (7'):
d
The welfare effect of such a policy Is
d2 =(2c) d + (2q)d =(2c+ 2q)dq
tt t
Clearly,for >0and =0,d/dq >0.
The Nash equilibrium is found when dQ/dq =d*/dq
=0.Since the
countries are symmetric, both countries will arrive atthe same choice of—9-.,
output, and ifwillequal zero. At the non—cooperative equilibrium, there-
fore, = = (1—a)/a Fromthe formula for dQ, we see that c c
(9) qflC=— [(l—a)/a <°
q*nc—[(l—a)/a
The conclusion is straightforward. In a static model in which in-
flation is reduced only by exporting it abroad, the cooperative solution is
to live with inflation and to stabilize output. If countries act unilaterally,
they will each try to export some of the inflation resulting from a supply
shock. Output will be reduced in both countries and the attempt to export
inflation will cancel out. Thus the Nash equilibrium leaves lower output and
unchanged inflation.
Five remarks are in order. First, starting from a point of zero
inflation and =q1
=0,a negative supply shock <0will lead to
over—expansion and competitive depreciation, as each country tries to stabi-
lize a falling price level.
Second, it is not important that the countries recognize the gaming
aspects of policy to arrive at the suboptitnal Nash equilibrium. The countries
need not be conscious of trying to reduce output relative to their counter-
part. What is required is that their "reduced—form estimates" of theinfla-
tion unemployment tradeoff yield dPc /dq =
Third,the policy authorities need not see themselves as intention-
ally reducing q in order to raise if.They may, more likely, see themselves— 10—
asoperating directly on the exchange rate, via a moneycontraction, with the
"unfortunate" side—effect of a reduction in demand and output. The policy
actions under discussion are likely to be viewed as "exchange—ratepolicies"
rather than "output—policies."
Fourth, if the economies were operating under afixed exchange—rate
regime, they would likely not have the samefreedom of action to pursue the
policies under discussion. For example, under a"dollar—standard", in which
the home country is free to set M, and the other countryintervenes in the
foreign exchange market until M* is consistentwith M and with the par value
of the exchange rate, we would have the case thatwhen q is set, q* must be
set close to q.It is easy to specify a model in which fixed exchange rates
force q =q*,so that the home monetary authorityis led to select the co-
operative equilibrium.
Finally, even if the authorities are moreclever than Nash players,
and recognize that output growth in the other countryis set according to the
choice of output growth domestically, the
sub—optiinallty of the non-
cooperative outcome will be maintained. Specifically,suppose that each
policy authority makes a conjectureof his counterpart's action. The home
authority assumes q = andthe foreign authority assumes
=p(q),
with p' <1.Then, the output equilibrium willbe given as:
(10) =- [(l-a)/a](l- p') <0
(q) =— 11—
Theconjectural equilibrium leads to an output loss that is less than the
pure Nash case (qnc), but Is sub—optimal nonetheless. Bresnahan (1981) has
shown in the quadratic case that the conjectures can be made "rational" in
the sense that p' actually equals dq/dq, where the latter is the slope of
the foreign country's reaction function.
II. The Dynamic Model
In this section 1 verify that the sub—optimality of the Nash
equilibrium carries over to a dynamic context. The dynamic model adds two
major points of realism. Most important, it allows for a lagged effect of
domestic output on home Inflation, that is Independent of the terms of trade
effect. There will now be two ways to reduce inflation: low domestic out-
put, and terms—of—trade improvement. Second, it makes explicit the fact
that the terms—of—trade effect represents a temporary gain that is reversed
along a complete adjustment path. A country that engineers a terms—of—trade
improvement is merely trading off an inflation gain today for an inflation
loss in the future, as the terms of trade return to original level. None-
theless, when faced with high initial rates of inflation (e.g. Inherited
from a supply shock), a country will want to make that inter—temporal trade—
of f. And for that reason, the non—cooperative equilibrium will still be
Pareto inefficient.
Let us turn to the dynamic model. The price dynamics are still
given by (7'), as derived earlier. The social welfare functions are now— 12—
writtenas discounted sums of quadratic loss functions in q and:
(11) U =E(1+)[()2 + q]
=E(l+)[(*)2 + qq*2]
Pareto—optimalpolicies are given by pairs of sequences q }—ii—O,...,co
and that minimize a weighted average of U and
mm wU + (l_)U* 0 < w .￿. 1
{q} {q}
Given the symmetry of the model, we will continue to define the cooperative
equilibrium as the policy sequences that minimize O.5U+ 0.5U*. In view of
the concavity of U and U* in q and q*, and in view of the symmetryof the
model, the cooperative equilibrium is characterized by q
=q
for all t,
a fact which greatly simplifies our analysis.
In the Nash, non—cooperative equilibrium, we suppose thatthe home
authority chooses {qnc} to miniml:e U, taking {q'} as given;while the
foreign policy maker chooses {q1 }tominimize U ,taking{q1 }asgiven.
When we turn to the analytical solution to this problem wewill find that
an equilibrium might not exist, if spillovereffects (measured by )aretoo
large. We will restrict our attention to caseswhere an eqiilibrium in fact
exists.
Let us turn first to the cooperative case. In lightof the model's
symmetry (making q =q)
we see from (7') that:
= +t-l + [(1_a)/a1t— 13—
MinimizingO.5(U + U*) Is tantamount to minimizing U, subject to this infla—
tion equation. Details of the optimization are shown in Table 1. At time
zero, the entire future planned path of output is selected conditional on
c—l and the entire anticipated path of future (For example, an anti-
cipation of a future supply shock causes output to be reduced today, so that
inherited inflation is low when the supply shock eventually occurs).
The first order conditions lead to a 2 X 2 linear difference—
equation system in Pt and X, where is the shadow welfare loss associated
with a one—percentage point increase In inherited inflation (i.e. It
ct—i
is the co—state variable associated with the inflation equation). The system









with urn et A =0
t- t
Itis easy to verify that this equation system is saddlepoint stable, since
there is exactly one elgenvalue of the transition matrix with absolute value
greater thanl.0.-' Let the characteristic roots to the matrix in (12) be
v and v ,wherev1 <1and Jv >1.In fact 0 <v
<1and v >1(see
footnote 3). Then, the solution to (12), due to Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
is found to be:— 14—
TABLE1
The Cooperative Solution in the Two—Country Dynamic Game
A. Minimization Problem
(1) mm E(l_)tI(c)2 +




(2) {q} ={} Vt
,bysymmetry
B. Lagrangian




(2) = 0> =(1/24)X+i1(1)
(3) 3L/A =0==> = +ij.iq1+ [(l—a)/a]
t CC1t
(4) urn (1(5)t X =— 15—
(13) )C = V ( )C+(l-a)/a + {Ivc(l+2/)]vc












v =[2++p2/]/2-[(-Hp2/)2+ 42/Jh/2 /2
v =I2+-Hp2/]/2 + [(6+ip2/)2 + 42/]h/2 /2
Note that current inflation is a function of discounted values of future,
antIcIpated supply shocks, as well as lagged inflation.
To take a simple case, suppose that a one—time rise in S occurs at
t=O, so that p >0,and that is equal to zero for all t>O. From (13)
CO
wesee that the expression for inflation simplifies to:
=v()C Vt .￿..
Thatis, the optimal policy is to reduce inflation at a geometric rate,
given by v .Outputis given by:
=-(l/)(l-v)ct)c— 16—
Thus,output may be described as "leaning against the wind.t
The calculation of the non—cooperative equilibrium is shown in
Table 2. As in the cooperative equilibrium, symmetry of the model ensures
that q= q*flC ,and =0.But while in the cooperative case the con-
straint Tr =0was substituted into the inflation equation before the con-
strained optimization was performed, in the Nash equilibrium each policy—
maker acts as if he can influence iT, even though Irt =0will result in
equilibrium. Once again the optimization problem yeilds a 2 X 2 linear—




xt+l 2(l+S) (1+S) 0
with urn (l+o)t A =0
Note that when=0,(14) reduces to the cooperative case in (12).
For low values of ,thesystem in (14) displays saddlepoint stabil-
ity, with 0 < v < 1, and v > 1. The stable rootis positive. For inter—
mediate values of 1,weagain find saddlepoint stability, but now with
—l < flC < 0, and v > 1. For high values of ,thesystem is globally
unstable, with nc < —1. The unstable case, and the case —l < v < 0,
are not realistic or economically interesting (for v< 0, the economies
oscillate period to period between negative and positiveinflation rates) so— 17—
TABLE2
The Non—Cooperative Solution in the Two—Country Dynamic Game
A. Minimization Problem
(1) mm -(16)_t[(A)2 +
s.t. c—l given ; q =0
= + +[(l_a)/a] +
{q}=01
(2) {q} ={} ,, bysymmetry
B. Lagrangian
L-(1÷)_t{[()2+ q()2]+ -- _l[(l_a)/a] t=O t t t—l
—
C.First—Order Conditions
(1) L/c =0> =2(1+5)+ (i+d)A
t t
(2) L/a 0 =>(1/2){A+fp/(l+S)
—[A_X+i/(l+5)]}
(3) = +[(l—a)/a]+ —
(4)
(5) urn (1÷)_t =0
t-+co— 18—
wenow confine our attention to the case where 0 <v
<1.The condition on
is<c/i,(seefootnote 4).
The optimal non—cooperative paths of and are found to be:












2+ 42/ + 4/]l/2 /2
Once again, consider the case when =0for all t >0,and >0.
In Nash equilibrium, policy makers again reduce inflation at a constant geo-
metric rate, given now by v. Output is again "leaning against the wind"
with qnc =
Thekey result of this sectionis that v >v,inother words
that the cooperative solution is to reduce inherited inflation more slowly— 19—
thanin the non—cooperative case. Once again, when countries act inde-
pendently, they race to be the first to contract when they have inherited a
high initial rate of inflation. It Is easy to show that v —vdepends
precisely upon the potential gain from a terms—of—trade improvement, as




Since q =—(l/iIJ)(l—v)c and pc =VC
t t t—1
we have that (for =0)
(16) q =_(l/)(l_v)(v)t
Similarly,
(17) qnc =_(l/)(l_v)(v)t t.￿o
Itis easy to see that there exists a period T, such that for 0 < t < T,
O > q > q ; and for t> T, 0 > qnc > C Also, Jim qnc =q
=0.
Thus, the non—cooperative policy involves larger output losses in
the adjustment process, and smaller output losses later on. The total loss
of output, measured as
tO
is exactly the same in both cases.
Figure 1 shows the time paths of q and qCThe curves cross at
time T, as defined above. (Strictly, they cross in the interval (T—l, T+l).)
By construction, the cooperative solution is Pareto optimal, and
Pareto dominates the non—cooperative solution. By substituting the equations
for inflation and output back into the utility functions, we may directly
C flC verify that U > U— 20—
> time
C nC









We have illustrated in this paper that non—cooperative policy
making in a two—country model with flexible exchange rates is likely to
result in Pareto inefficient equilibria. In the specific, stylized model
under investigation here, the source of inefficiency is that each country
attempts to manipulate the exchange rate to its own advantage in fighting
inflation, though in equilibrium these attempts cancel Out and prove self—
defeating.
Other papers, cited in the introduction, have investigated other
possible courses of inefficiency. One novelty of this paper is the exten-
sion of the policy game to an intertemporal environment.
There are several extensions of this model that should prove
worthwhile. First, using equations (13) and (15), we could discuss the
possible inefficiencies in response to anticipated future changes in the
global environment. Second, we might usefully extend the model to non—
symmetrical cases, and consider the effects on equilibrium If one country
acts as a Stackelberg leader vis——vis the other. Third, we should spell
out the macroeconomic model with more care, to see whether the Introduction
of several policy instruments In each country could alter the basic effects
observed here. Fourth, we might imbed the two countries in a specific and
detailed institutional environment with respect to exchange rate rules, to
see how changes in global rules affects the efficiency of equilibrium (e.g.
compare a gold standard, dollar—exchange standard, and freely floating ex-
change regime). Finally, we might usefully introduce a stochastic structure— 22—
tosee how the relative prevalence of various typesof disturbances affects
the desirability of alternative "rules of the game."— 23—
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FOOTNOTES
1. In the Great Depression, for example, a series of "competitive devaluations"
in all countries could have raised the world money stock to the advantage of
all of the countries.
2. See the seminal contribution of H. Johnson (1953).
3. Let 0.v. —1,where v is a characteristic root of (12). According to
the characteristic equation for (12), 0. is a root of the equation:
-+ =o
ByDescartes' law of signs, there are two values of 0., one positive and one
negative. Also, it is clear that the negative value of 0. must be —1 <0
<0,
since the equation may be rewritten as
- -(1+ 0.) =0
for which the LHS is always the positive for 0 <—1.Thus, since vi =01+ 1,
there is one root v1 that is 0 <v
<1(corresponding to —1 <0
<0)and
one root v. that is v1 >1(corresponding to Oi >0).
4. The conditions on are derived as in footnote 3. Again, let 0 =v.—1.
Then, 04 is a root of the equation
-[ +-)/]0. - + =
Again,there is one change of sign, so that one value of 0 is positive and
the other is negative. The negative root is greater than —1 if and only if
< which we assume. The negative root is between —1 and —2 (inclusive)
if and only if /i.￿.13 1 (42&2),(2 3). Once we assume 13 <
thenthe v. corresponding to the negative 01 is between 0 and 1, and the v
corresponding to the positive O is greater than 1. We write:
0 <nc<1<vT— 25
5. From the definitions of v in (12) and v in (15), we see that v =v
when=0.It is also true (see below) that <0while =0.
Thus, for positive ,v
>v.
Also, it follows that (v —v5/
>0.
To show that v/t3 <0,first define
E =[{+[()/]}2 +42/ + 4/}1/2
sothat v =[2++ p(p—)/]/2 —E/2
Then, by direct computation:
=—(ip/24)1 +[S—pp—)/4I/E}.
It is easy to show that [5 ——)/]2/E2<1,so that must be
negative.
6. In both the nc and c cases, an initial level of Inflation is reduced
to zero over time (with lim =0).For =0and =q,the inflation
t-o












Thus, the total amount of foregone output is set by the initialinflation rate.
The nc path and the c path entail an identical level of total output loss.